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WHEN IS NOT CARING ETHICAL?:
THE MEDICAL ETHICS AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF
REFUSING TO TREAT DETAINEES SUBJECTED TO
INTERROGATIONS AND TORTURE
SHANNON M. COIT*

1. INTRODUCTION
Medical professionals obey the Hippocratic Oath, standing for
the principle of ’do no harm.’1 But, at a point, refusing to provide
care becomes the more ethical choice for medical professionals
responsible for treating detainees and prisoners of war. Torture
and improper interrogation remain a constant and present practice
during war, internationally and by the United States, especially in
recent Administrations.2 Reports find that the “[l]egal, ethical, and
medical condemnation have not been as effective as their
proponents hoped: torture is widespread in more than a third of
countries, and medical implication is described in at least 40
percent of reported torture cases.”3 Currently, the United States,
other countries, and the international community have policies in
place requiring medical professionals to provide adequate medical
*
University of Pennsylvania Law School, J.D. 2014; University of
Pennsylvania Perelman School of Medicine, M.B.E. 2014; The University of
Michigan, B.A. 2006. I would like to thank Professor Claire Finkelstein for her
guidance and facilitating this comment; Kathy Nguyen, Shannon Doherty, and the
entire Penn JIL editorial staff for its hard work on this comment and dedication to
JIL; and my husband, Daniel Spradling, for his continued support and early
editing. All opinions and mistakes are my own.
1
Greek Medicine, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH: HIST. OF MED. DIV.,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/greek_oath.html (last visited Dec. 18,
2013) (including the history of and the current edition of the Hippocratic Oath,
with the phrase “do no harm”).
2 Chiara Lepora & Joseph Millum, The Tortured Patient: A Medical Dilemma, 41
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 38, 38 (2011).
3 Id. at 39 (footnotes omitted).
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care during interrogations or for prisoners of war.4 However, if
detainees are subjected to multiple interrogations or torture that
create physically and mentally stressful situations, then when
doctors and medical professionals render care, they are only
prolonging this suffering.
When ’do no harm‘ is upheld by not rendering care, the
international community and the United States do not have proper
policies and practices in place that permit and protect the medical
professionals making these decisions. This comment will examine
the intersection between medical ethics, morality, and the law in
circumstances of interrogation and with detainees, especially
during the time of war when aims of national security and war are
particularly prevalent. International communities and the United
States should implement policies that will protect medical
professionals from liability for torture or complicity to torture
offenses in these limited circumstances where refusing care is
required. These policies should also include notice and reporting
requirements to ensure that these decisions are not made within a
vacuum and allow for correction of improper treatment before the
refusal of treatment.
Section 2 will examine the background of torture statutes,
medical ethics, and the combatant status of detainees. Exploring
an example of refusing to provide care in Libya will provide
helpful insight into the current state of policies as well as real
circumstances doctors are facing in the field. This section will also
evaluate these current policies regarding whether doctors and
medical professionals can refuse to provide care.
Section 3 provides the ethical evaluation of these proposed
actions, or more properly described as inactions. Drawing analogy
between the ethics and policies of the medical community’s refusal
of allowing psychiatrists to participate in the death penalty serves
as an important and relevant example to understanding the moral
obligations in refusing care. I also advocate in this section for an
intention-based model of ethical evaluation over a consequencebased model to justify these actions. However, refusing to provide
care can also be justified under a consequence-focused evaluation.
This section introduces some war conventions, rule of war
principles, and other duties of medical professionals that apply in
these circumstances.

4

See infra notes 11, 16–18 and accompanying text.
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Not only is this course of action ethically justified, but Section 4
will explore why it should also be legal to refuse to provide care,
and why providing care might already be illegal. Providing care
equates to complicity to torture or violates torture statutes in
extreme situations. Many situations are close calls and fall into a
gray area that require keen professional judgment, but black and
white situations do exist for evaluating what the laws should
prevent.
Section 5 provides policy proposals based on the ethical and
legal permissibility. These policies should exist as exceptions to
providing adequate care in circumstances where trained medical
professionals determine that repeated offenses are likely to occur
and that treatment will only contribute to ongoing interrogation
and torture efforts. These policy exceptions are not without
safeguards. These safeguards include notice requirements by the
medical professionals to offending individuals and governments
that the physicians will discontinue care if the mistreatment of
detainees does not cease. Doctors will also have reporting
requirements, including following established lines of reporting for
medical professionals. These policy exceptions will allow for
doctors and medical professionals to preserve their medical
autonomy while still protecting detainees and the international
community from continued human rights abuses. This section also
explores recently proposed state legislation protecting medical
professionals in situations regarding torture. By refusing to
provide care, these professionals are providing the right medical
and ethical decision for these detainees to lessen their suffering,
and this paper provides the legal policies that allow them to do it.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1.

Combatants and Unarmed Combatants

Defining the status of detainees is relevant to the discussion of
what type of medical care detainees should or should not receive
because, traditionally, different ethics apply to individuals at a
time of war based on their status.5 An enemy combatant is “a
person engaged in hostilities against [a country] during an armed
5
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (3d ed. 2000).
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conflict.”6 The Principle of Distinction is a Rule of War principle
that allows for the killing of combatants,7 based on their status, at
any time, regardless of what they are doing, even if that action is
sleeping, while prohibiting the intentional killing of civilians.8
Thus, how an individual is treated in war is based on their status,
not by the activity in which they are engaged. An exception under
the Principle of Distinction applies to combatants that have
surrendered or that are injured and out of combat.9 Because of this
exception, surrendered and/or injured combatants cannot be killed
at any point, and rather certain duties and protections attach to
these individuals.10 These protections include receiving adequate
medical care and humane treatment.11 Thus, for doctors and
medical professionals, this loss of combatant status creates a type
of duty to protect these detainees by creating a duty to provide
adequate medical care.12 This paper will explore what adequate
medical care means in situations of continued and repeated
incidents of improper interrogation and torture.
2.2.

Torture Statutes

Currently, the United States, European Union, and other
sources of international law have extensive statutes, policies, and
practices governing the treatment of torture that continue to
6 DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3 (FM 34-52): HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTOR OPERATIONS, at viii, 5-20 (2006) [hereinafter ARMY FIELD MANUAL],
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-223.pdf.
7 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOLUME 1: RULES (2005),
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule1
(outlining 161 rules for international humanitarian law, including rule 1 titled
“The Principle of Distinction between Civilians and Combatants”).
8 WALZER, supra note 5, at 138.
9 Id. (“[O]nce war has begun, soldiers are subject to attack at any time (unless
they are wounded or captured).”).
10
See ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 6, at viii (“All captured or detained
personnel, regardless of status, shall be treated humanely, and in accordance with
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 . . . .”).
11
GUIDELINES TO EU POLICY TOWARDS THIRD COUNTRIES ON TORTURE AND
OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (2008), available
at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/TortureGuidelines.pdf.
12 See supra note 11 and infra notes 16–17, 22–24 and accompanying text.
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develop, even within the last ten years. For the United States,
during the Bush Administration, Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld ordered that doctors had to certify prisoners “medically
and operationally” suitable for torture and to be present for
sessions.13 At Abu Ghraib, a military prison in Iraq, interrogations
had to be preapproved by a physician and a psychiatrist, though
reports since have found that these medical approvals did not
ensure or even give notice that the interrogations were medically
ethical.14 Similarly, military doctors’ failure to report torture, even
informally, became a repeated issue.15
During Obama
Administration, following the public outcry regarding U.S.
practices at Guantanamo, the President took action to improve the
U.S. stance toward interrogation. In 2006, his Administration
changed the Department of Defense’s detention policy to ban
“depriv[ing] detainees of the necessary food, water
and medical care,” though a 2014 Senate Select Intelligence
Committee report contained allegations that the Central
Intelligence Committee (CIA) continues to use medical personnel
in interrogations.16 The Army Field Manual includes these
13
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Memorandum for the Commander,
US Southern Command, DEP’T OF DEFENSE, tab B(x)(iii), (vi) (Apr. 16, 2003), available
at http://www.defense.gov/news/jun2004/d20040622doc9.pdf (quoting the
unclassified document written by Secretary Rumsfeld regarding “CounterResistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism”).
14
Justine Sharrock, First, Do Harm, MOTHER JONES, July/Aug. 2009,
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/07/first-do-harm.
15
See, e.g., Sophie Arie, Doctors Need Better Training to Recognise and Report
Torture, BMJ, Sept. 9, 2011, http://www.bmj.com/content/343/bmj.d5766
(“Military doctors have also failed to report signs of abuse in detainees); CBS
News, U.S. Doctors Participated in Torture of Detainees, Report Claims, CBCNEWS
(Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/u-s-doctors-participated-intorture-of-detainees-report-claims-1.2355511 (“The task force alleges that DoD
practices and policies . . . co-opted [doctors] into violating professional standards
and ethics through actions that included . . . [f]ailing to report abuses against
detainees ‘under recognized international standards.’”); Harriet Sherwood, Israeli
Doctors ‘Failing to Report Torture of Palestinian Detainees,’ THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 3,
2011, 4:53 AM) (reporting on accusations that Israeli doctors are failing to report
injuries of detainees that relate to abusive interrogations and torture).
16
Lieutenant General John Kimmons, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Defense Department News Briefing on Detainee Policies (Sept. 6,
2006)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/09/06/AR2006090601442.html); SEN. SELECT COMM. ON
INTELLIGENCE, COMMITTEE STUDY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S
DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM (2014) [hereinafter 2014 SENATE CIA
REPORT], available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/study2014/executivesummary.pdf. The report includes accusations that medical professionals
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requirements and prohibits implementing any forms of
interrogation outside what is described in the manual.17 Though
no case in the U.S. courts has held medical professionals liable for
torture, the medical community collectively disapproves of these
actions by medical professionals and works to find solutions to
preventing these deviations from ethical behavior in the future.18
Torture laws and policies also restrict doctors and medical
professionals, such as nurses, from participating in interrogations.
Reports from Guantanamo found that psychiatrists and other
physicians were providing information about detainees to make
interrogation techniques “more efficient” and permitted these
professionals to closely monitor the interrogations.19 As The
Constitutional Project states, “the use of psychologists,
psychiatrists and other physicians, and other medical and mental
health personnel, [] help assist and guide interrogations that were
often brutal.”20 The medical community quickly spoke out against
these types of actions, once they were known, and supported the
ban on participating in such activities because this type of
professional behavior violates medical ethics.21 Thus, though

continue to assist in brutal interrogation techniques, including specific instances
when medical professionals administered unnecessary and improper rectal
rehydration on detainees. Jennifer Bendrey, Dianne Feinstein: No, the CIA Did Not
Use Rectal Hydration as ‘a Medical Procedure’ on Detainees, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec.
12, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/12/dianne-feinstein-ciatorture-report_n_6318336.html. The CIA denied these accusations. Id.
17
See generally ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 6 (explicitly stating that the
interrogation approaches and techniques that are authorized for use are those
authorized and listed in this Field Manual).
18 See AM. MED. ASS’N, AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, Opinion 2.067: Torture
(1999) [hereinafter CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS] (stating the AMA’s opposition to any
type of participation in torture in Opinion 2.067: Torture); see also THE
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT’S TASK FORCE ON
DETAINEE TREATMENT: ABRIDGED VERSION 30–31 (2013) [hereinafter THE
CONSTITUTION PROJECT], available at http://detaineetaskforce.org/pdf/abridgedfinal.pdf (asserting the need for professional medical involvement by medical
professionals in detention and interrogation operations processes).
19 THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 18, at 30.
20
Id. at 30–31 (“The involvement of medical personnel was ostensibly to
make the process more efficient (psychologists could provide guidance to
interrogators as to how best obtain information) . . . .”); see Sharrock, supra note 14
(“[Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld ordered that doctors had to certify
prisoners ‘medically and operationally’ suitable for torture and be present for the
sessions.”).
21
THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 18, at 31 (“[The American
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medical professionals are required to provide adequate medical
care, they cannot overstep those boundaries.
Internationally, torture is regularly defined as including “acts
of omission, such as prolonged denial of . . . medical assistance.”22
Article 7 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) binds international communities from using
torture, administering cruel and unusual punishment, and
conducting medical experiments without a patient’s consent.23
Part of these policies stems from a tradition of providing medical
care to detainees.24 Various statues require ‘adequate medical care’
in these various torture and detention statute and laws.
International courts and tribunals additionally find violations of
torture statutes when medical care is not provided.
The
International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia reported
on woefully inadequate medical assistance in Prosecutor v. Kvocka,
ICTFY.25 In Achuthan v. Malawi, the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights found a violation of Article 5 of the
Psychiatric Association] decided, with little dissent, that its members could not
ethically participate in any way in the interrogations.”).
22 Torture includes “acts of omission, such as prolonged denial of rest, sleep,
food, sufficient hygiene, or medical assistance . . . .” David Weissbrodt & Cheryl
Heilman, Defining Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment, 29 LAW &
INEQ. 343, 378 (2011) (citing Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Comm’n on Human Rights,
42d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15, at 106–17 (Feb. 16, 1986) (by P.
Kooijmans)). See ECCC Training Materials, INT’L CRIM. L. SERVS. & OPEN SOC’Y
JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ¶ 60 (2009), available at http://www.iclsfoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/eccc-trainingmaterials-icls-osji-09-prt5.pdf
(“The
following acts have been found to constitute torture by the UN Human Rights
Committee, the European Court of Human Rights and the Special Rapporteur on
Torture for the UN Commission on Human Rights: . . . prolonged denial of
medical assistance . . . .”).
23
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
24
See GUIDELINES TO EU POLICY, supra note 11 (requiring medical care for
detainees); see also Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Review of the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners: 2013I, Comm’n on Human Rights, 68th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/68/295, ¶¶ 46, 50 (Aug. 9, 2013) (by Juan E. Méndez) (stating that “a lack of
financial resources cannot be an excuse for not . . . providing food and medical
treatment” and that “[t]he State must provide adequate medical care”); STEVEN H.
MILES, OATH BETRAYED: TORTURE, MEDICAL COMPLICITY, AND THE WAR ON TERROR
(2006) (stating that the United States has a “tradition of medical care for prisoners
of war”).
25
Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶¶ 61–67 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Nov. 2, 2001).
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African Charter, which prohibits “torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment and treatment” when a detainee was
denied “access to adequate medical care.”26 The UN Human
Rights Committee held that being deprived of “adequate medical
care,” inter alia, resulted in torture in Mika Miha v. Equatorial
Guinea.27 This strong history in the international community
supports physicians in providing care, though these same
protections and provisions do not always provide for exceptions to
refuse to provide care when medical care assists torturers.
2.3.

Medical Ethics

The Hippocratic Oath is taken by most doctors and medical
professionals, and is commonly known for standing for ‘do no
harm.’28 Much like the professional ethics of lawyers, the
physician-patient relationship enjoys protections and privileges of
confidentiality, duties of communication, and protections from
termination without notice, cause, or completion of care.29 These
ethics apply regardless if the patient is a former enemy combatant
or whether they are practicing in a hostile situation, such as a
prison’s medical center or with detainees subjected to improper
treatments. As Dr. Steven H. Miles examines in his book regarding
medical ethics with detainees: “Medical ethics and international
codes of conduct oblige [medical professionals] to prevent and
disclose torture.”30 Thus, in addition to moral ethics, doctors, like
lawyers, are subject to professional ethics. These ethics include
assessing the medical situation of their patient and treating in a
way that ultimately does ‘no harm’ to the patients. This duty to
their patients should come before their roles as a soldier, military
26
Achuthan (on behalf of Aleke Banda) v. Malawi, African Comm’n on
Human & Peoples’ Rights, 8th Annual Activity Report, Comm’n No. 64/92, ¶ 7
(1995), available at http:// www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/6492b.html.
27
Mika Miha v. Equatorial Guinea, Commc’n No. 414/1990, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/51/D/414/1990, ¶ 6.4 (U.N. Human Rights Comm. 1994), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/vws414.htm.
28 See Greek Medicine, supra note 1.
29
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 18 (referencing Opinion 10.10:
Fundamental Elements of the Patient-Physician Relationship, which include
confidentiality, continuity of treatment, and other duties and obligations).
30 MILES, supra note 24.
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doctor, or any other role they may be fulfilling.31
2.4.

Recent Example of Refusing to Provide Care

A recent example out of Libya serves as a model where doctors
decided that they upheld their medical ethics by refusing to
provide care to detainees subjected to torture. In July 2013,
Doctors Without Borders (or Médecins Sans Frontières)
(“DWB/MSF”) refused to continue to treat victims of
interrogations and torture because of their repeated injuries from
abuse.32 Patients were brought to prison doctors and medical
professionals between interrogations for medical treatment so that
the detainees could heal from the wounds they sustained during
beatings and torture, only to return to the interrogation centers to
withstand further brutal interrogations.33 The doctors and medical
professionals stated their role is to “’provide medical care to war
casualties and sick detainees, not to repeatedly treat the same
patients between torture sessions.’”34 Both officially recognized
military and security bodies carried out these interrogations, as
well as by a number of armed militias operating outside any legal
framework.35 The group of doctors treated 115 detainees in total36
31 George J. Annas, Military Medical Ethics – Physicians First, Last, Always, 359
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1087, 1087–90 (2008) (arguing that physicians should remember,
especially in the face of human rights violations like torture, not only that they are
physicians “first” but that they are also physicians “‘last and always’”).
32
Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, Libya: Detainees Tortured and
Denied
Medical
Care
(Jan.
26,
2012),
available
at
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news-stories/press-release/libyadetainees-tortured-and-denied-medical-care.
33
Id. See also MSNBC.com News Services, Medical Group Refuses to Treat
Libya Prisoners ‘Between Torture Sessions,’ NBCNEWS.COM (Jan. 26, 2012, 2:04 PM),
http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/01/26/10245098-medical-grouprefuses-to-treat-libya-prisoners-between-torture-sessions (providing additional
reporting on the DWB/MSF decision to withdraw from providing care in Libya).
34 Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, supra note 32 (quoting DWB/MSF
General Director Christopher Stokes).
35
See id. (stating that notification letters were sent to “the Misrata Military
Council, the Misrata Security Committee, the National Army Security Service, and
the Misrata Local Civil Council”). See also MSNBC.com News Services, supra note
33 (noting the torture was carried out by “officially recognized military and
security bodies as well as by a number of armed militias operating outside any
legal framework”).
36 Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, supra note 32.
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for torture related injuries, including a group of nine detainees
after the doctors sent notification letters.37 The doctors identified
numerous injuries and obvious signs of torture, including two
deaths.38 Before refusing to provide care, the doctors notified the
National Army Security Service that a number of patients needed
to be transferred to hospitals for urgent and specialized care.39
However, these patients were taken back to interrogation centers.40
Thus, even after notifying the offending bodies and stating that the
doctors would have to refuse to provide medical care, the doctors
continued to receive tortured patients.41 Only after that point did
DWB/MSF cut off providing care.42
This example provides a realistic view of what some doctors
and medical professionals face, or will have to face, within this
realm of practicing medicine. The DWB/MSF example also
provides a practical, responsible guide for actions that should be
taken when doctors and medical professionals determine, based on
their medical and ethical judgment, that providing care is no
longer acceptable for these patients. This example shows what
refusing care would look like in practice as this comment examines
the ethical justification of these actions and proposes a legal
framework to support it.
3. ETHICAL EVALUATION OF REFUSING TO PROVIDE CARE
3.1.

Ethical Analysis

Physicians and medical professionals are justified in refusing to
provide care to detainees under certain conditions because their
actions, if performed with a permissible intention, ultimately fulfill
37
Id. (“The most alarming case [was] when MSF doctors treated a group of
14 detainees who returned to a detention facility from an interrogation center.
Despite previous MSF demands for the immediate end of torture, 9 of the 14
detainees had suffered numerous injuries and displayed obvious signs of
torture.”).
38
See MSNBC.com News Services, supra note 33 (providing additional
information regarding the injuries and suspected deaths).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41
Id. See also Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, supra note 32
(referencing receiving nine detainees that were victims of repeated torture).
42 Id.
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their duty to do no harm and end prolonged suffering of their
patient. This ethical justification is not based on consequences
alone, though doctors and medical professionals must determine
whether their actions of treating a detainee will ultimately lead to
the continued suffering of that patient. I argue that the intention to
minimize harm is required, rather than the consequences alone of
refusing care, because the actor must have an ethical state of mind
to fulfill their professional and ethical duty to not harm others.
Refusing care in these circumstances is also analogous to the
medical community’s prohibition on participating in the death
penalty, specifically in that psychiatrists cannot determine a
prisoner’s mental fitness for execution.
Doctors and medical professionals must use their trained
medical judgment to assess the specific situation that they face, and
must ultimately decide that refusing to care for a certain patient is
the justified course action. Refusing to provide care is justified
because it fulfills the deontological duty to others as well as the
professional duty to do no harm. (Though I advocate from a
deontological point of view, consequentialists could also find that
not providing care is justified in these circumstances because the
overall consequences of the action – the reduction of continued
pain and suffering of the detainee – increases the good to justify
the action.) A duty to others, similar to the duty to ‘do no harm,’ is
a core deontological duty.43 In determining where their duty to
others is implicated, the medical professional must consider factors
like the extent of the detainee’s injuries, the likelihood the injuries
will occur again, and other relevant factors. For example, if a
detainee is a repeat patient for the same or similar injuries that
correlate with circumstances of abusive interrogation or torture,
the doctor can likely assume this patient will continue to suffer the
same or similar injuries after he recovers with the aid of that
doctor.44
Once this duty to others is implicated, medical
professionals must act to protect and assist the detainee because of
their position and ability to provide care. Then, any of the
43
Kantian Duty Based (Deontological) Ethics, SEVEN PILLARS INST.,
http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/morality-101/kantian-duty-based-deontologicalethics (last visited Dec. 18, 2013) (stating Kant’s first categorical imperative of “’Do
not impose on others what you do not wish for yourself’” and his second
categorical imperative that “a person must maintain her moral duty to seek an
end that is equal for all people”).
44 This determination is much like the one the DWB/MSF physicians made.
See Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, supra note 32.
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doctors’ and medical professionals’ actions to reduce the pain and
suffering endured by this patient are justified, if done with the aim
to fulfill this duty to others. These actions may require treating, or
they may require refusing to provide care if the physician or nurse
determines that their assistance to the patient will only lead to the
repeated abuse.
Making the determination not to treat is no easy task. Gray
areas will exist that may require additional consideration of other
deontological duties and factors based on the facts of each case.
However, black and white cases do exist, as demonstrated in the
example above with Libya. These clear cases are when the doctors
reasonably know that providing treatment will only keep the
detainees healthy enough to be subjected to more torture and
abusive interrogations. At this point, if the doctor provides
immediate treatment, they would contribute to the detainee’s longterm pain and suffering because the detainee is now available to
endure further torture and other abusive conduct. Here, the
doctors and medical professionals become a part of the cycle of
torture and abusive interrogations. In these circumstances, the
medical professionals involved need to follow their duty to others,
refuse to treat the detainee, and cease to assist in the detainee’s
continued pain and suffering.
3.2.

Intention-Based Model Is Required for Justification

Having policy and laws that focus on reducing the overall
amount of suffering for a detainee seem to satisfy ethics models
based on deontological and consequentialist principles. However,
I argue that, in these circumstances, an ethics model focused on
intentions and duties is best because this model provides
important limits on what behavior is ethically justified. Limits
come from duties, similar to duties that doctors develop through
their responsibilities as members of the medical community. These
duties also promote behavior that is desirable – getting good,
unbiased treatment decisions – rather than decisions based on
outcomes that could also satisfy other ‘bad’ motivations, such as
being primarily motivated by a dislike for what the detainee
believes or supports.
G. E. M. Anscombe advocates for an intention-based model,
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especially as it applies to war.45 Anscombe makes this distinction
because she finds that the morality of decisions is based in the
intentions of the actor,46 not in the culpability of the opposing
actor47 or total utility of a situation.48 These intentions matter
because they are linked to the duties and absolute prohibitions –
duty to others, duty to not kill, etc. – that one must follow as moral
actors.49 Thus, the intent to act in accordance with duties – both
that are innate and those that apply as a professional – should be
the measure of whether an act is justified or not, and not what
happens after the act.50 This focus on intent to comply with duties
and prohibitions is also what places the limit on conduct that
Anscombe discusses. These duties and absolute prohibitions
provide the clear-cut impermissible cases so that the doctrine of
double effect is not taken to its extreme.51 Though, her distinction
still allows for actions with ‘bad’ consequences, such as death of
the detainee from lack of care, because the actor was ultimately
attempting to act morally within the permissible bounds of her
duties and prohibitions.52
Take the hypothetical case that is modeled off what was seen in
Guantanamo.53 A detainee is brought to the prison hospital,
showing signs of repeated beating, food depravation, and
exhaustion. He also exhibits symptoms of diabetic shock resulting
from the conditions that he endured. One doctor assesses that he
has seen this patient before many times, and previously notified
45
G. E. M. Anscombe, War and Murder, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A CATHOLIC
RESPONSE 45 (Walter Stein ed., 1961).
46 Id.
47 See JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR (2009) (advocating for a model where
the culpability of the actor is determinative).
48 Utility of a situation, or utilitarianism, is similar to Consequentialism, both
of which are seen as opposing theories to deontological/duty-based ethical
models.
49 Anscombe, supra note 45.
50 Id.
51
Anscombe includes a very good analysis of the limits of ‘intention’ to
avoid taking the doctrine of double effect too far to essentially render ‘intention’
meaningless. See id.
52
See id. (providing the example of self-defense when one is intending to
“ward off an attack” not intending to kill someone).
53
Sharrock, supra note 14 (detailing a story out of Guantanamo where a
medic wanted to treat detainee for diabetic shock, but was ridiculed and ignored
by higher-ups, colleagues, and soldiers, so care was not rendered. The detainee
ended up dying from lack of treatment, though he did not suffer further abusive
interrogation).
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his superiors and other officials of the patient’s condition and
general concerns regarding his condition. The doctor ultimately
makes a judgment not to treat the patient because the doctor
reasonably believes that if he treats the patient today, he will only
continue to see this patient after future torture sessions. Another
doctor in the hospital encounters the same patient, but refuses to
treat because she does not approve of this patient’s extreme beliefs
and knows what will reasonably result from not treating. Because
of the lack of treatment, the detainee dies of diabetic shock. In both
of these cases, where one doctor decides not to treat to cause the
least amount of harm and the other doctor chooses not to treat
because she does not value the detainee, the harm avoided –
prolonged suffering from being subjected to aggressive
interrogations – is the same. Yet, Anscombe would find these cases
are different moral situations where the first case is justifiable and
the second is not based on the intent of the doctor.
Anscombe finds a moral distinction between the first doctor’s
action that merely foresees (not treating a patient) a bad
consequence (patient dies) and that same action from the second
doctor that intends (not treating a patient) the bad consequence
(patient dies). Part of this distinction is because the first doctor is
not attempting to bring about the bad consequence, but rather
something else: minimizing the pain and suffering of the patient.
Anscombe does caution against using this logic to its extreme
where it becomes dangerous54 – i.e. the second doctor incorrectly
rationalizing, ’I didn’t intend to let the patient die, I simply
intended to not to provide care, thus it’s permissible.’ Anscombe
recognizes that, when taken to the extreme, the doctrine of double
effect can justify anything from the actor’s point of view.55 Thus,
when applied correctly, the intention-based rationale is the most
appropriate here because only doctors who exercise their proper
medical judgment should be justified in their actions, not those
trying to achieve other ill-intended results under the veil of
treatment.
In other words, for this hypothetical example,
intending the patient’s death is different from foreseeing that death

54 Anscombe, supra note 45 (cautioning against mistaking what one actually
intends and what one attempts to say they ‘intend’ to merely justify their action,
essentially expressing the limits of the doctrine of double effect).
55
Id. (“It is nonsense to pretend that you do not intend to do what is the
means you take to your chosen end. Otherwise there is absolutely no substance to
the [Christian] teaching that we may not do evil that good may come.”). Id. at 59.
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when refusing to provide care because these two acts can be
distinguished between the ‘wanting’ of something to happen
(second doctor) and the ‘predicting’ something will happen (first
doctor). Doctors ‘wanting’ the bad consequence by not treating are
not justified in their actions. The doctor who can predict a death
while refusing to provide care for the patient’s overall well-being is
the one executing a justified act. Again, having a ‘good motive’
while foreseeing a bad consequence still lends to an ethically
justified act.
3.3.

The Medical Ethics Analogy of Treating on Death Row

The medical community’s refusal to participate in the death
penalty provides a strong analogy to the policy, reasoning, and
ethics of refusing to provide care to those subjected to repeated
torture. The medical community has “longstanding and absolute
prohibition” of participating in lethal injection executions.56
Because the Eighth Amendment bans the execution of the mentally
incompetent,57 this prohibition in the United States includes
banning psychiatrists from declaring a death row inmate mentally
competent for execution.58 The medical community finds that
engaging in such behavior violates the core medical ethics, and this
prohibition is balanced against the State’s desire to inflict
punishment, much like the national security goals that medical
practitioners face during a time of war.59
The American
Medication Association’s (AMA) prohibition rationalizes that
56
Lawrence Nelson & Brandon Ashby, Rethinking the Ethics of Physician
Participation in Lethal Injection Execution, 41 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 28 (2011).
57
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 339 (1986) (holding that executing those
inmates that are not mentally competent is cruel and unusual punishment and
unconstitutional under the eighth amendment).
58 See Alfred M. Freedman & Abraham L. Halpern, A Crisis in the Ethical and
Moral Behavior of Psychiatrists, 11 CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCHIATRY 1, 2 (1998),
available
at
http://www.wpanet.org/uploads/Publications/WPA_Books/Additional_Public
ations/WPA_Forums_on_Current_Opinion/psychiatrists-death-penalty.pdf
(debating the purpose and ban on psychiatric evaluations of competence to be
executed).
59
See id. (“Psychiatrists today are indeed torn between traditional ethical
principles and strong pressures from society, particularly certain segments of the
legal profession, to make compromises and become collaborators in the demands
of the law.”).
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“[p]hysician participation in executions contradicts the dictates of
the medical profession by causing harm rather than alleviating
pain and suffering.”60 The World Psychiatric Association Congress
unanimously agreed that “’[u]nder no circumstances should
psychiatrists participate in legally authorized executions nor
participate in assessments of competence to be executed.’”61
Refusing to make competency determinations and refusing to
provide care for detainees subjected to abusive interrogations and
torture are analogous because, in both cases, the physician is not
actively participating in the harmful act (administering life ending
drugs or torture tactics), but their actions directly contribute to the
administration of the harmful act. A death row prisoner cannot
receive a lethal injection unless a psychiatrist determines they are
mentally competent.62 Similarly, a detainee that needs treatment
after being subjected to abusive interrogations and torture cannot
return to their interrogator without receiving treatment. Thus,
both of these physicians directly participate to their patient’s cycle
of ‘harm.’
Because the medical community agrees that
psychiatrists are ethically prohibited from participating in
competence evaluations for executions, even though they are not
directly administrating harm, physicians also cannot ethically treat
detainees that will only receive repeated abuses as a result of being
treated.
One key reason for prohibiting the participation of
psychiatrists in the death penalty is the proximity of the doctor’s
action to the execution.63 Drs. Alfred M. Freedman and Abraham
L. Halpern state, “The proximity of this participation and the act of
killing casts doctors, metaphorically, as hangmen’s accomplices.”64
This same proximity is also found in torture. When torture is
repeated, a cycle of abuse is formed. This cycle includes medical
treatment to keep detainees alive and well enough to sustain the
next round of interrogation or torture. The doctors’ participation
60
AM. MED. ASS’N, PHYSICIAN PARTICIPATION IN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CEJA
REPORT
A-I-92,
at
365
(1992),
available
at
http://www.amaassn.org/resources/doc/code-medical-ethics/206b.pdf.
61
See Freedman & Halpern, supra note 58, at 1 (examining the ethics of
psychiatrists’ participation in the death penalty).
62 See infra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. Ford v. Wainwright also holds
that inmates must receive a competency determination upon request. 477 U.S.
399, 430–31 (1986).
63 Freedman & Halpern, supra note 58.
64 Id. at 1.
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as a part of the cycle becomes impermissible because the doctors
become ethical ‘accomplices’ to the torturers.
Counter arguments for allowing psychiatrists to participate the
death penalty are similar to those that apply to torture: these
arguments state that the psychiatrists are providing a dual role for
the justice system. In other words, physicians should be acting as
something other than ‘physicians first.’ Thus, these psychiatrists
are not subject to traditional medical ethics. Proponents of
absolute prohibitions for psychiatrists actually caution against this
type of argument because of its implications for physicians in
“executions, torture or managed care administration.”65 This
reasoning strips a psychiatrist, or physician, from any medical
ethics’ limitations and leaves the physician as an unregulated
practitioner. This practice also risks losing the trust of the public,
or worse “public condemnation.”66 In addition to the reaction of
the public, the medical community makes it clear that declaring
prisoners competent for the death penalty is simply participating
in unethical behavior. This same rationale and prohibition should
apply to medical professionals treating detainees subjected to
repeated torture and abuse, and that the risk of placing these
doctors in close proximity to the torturers is just too great.
3.4.

Additional Applicable War Conventions: Mixture of Law
and Ethics

War conventions are formed from a combination of culture,
legal, ethical, and other priorities from various countries and the
international community. This comment already discussed the
medical ethics, professional standards, and existing laws that
contribute to war conventions surrounding treating, or not
treating, in situations of abusive interrogation and torture. Other
sources of culture and codes additionally lend themselves to this
discussion. Rule of War principles, such as the Principle of
Distinction, discussed supra in Section 2.1., also provides the
necessary understanding that status of the individuals that receive
treatment. These principles are important because detainees
receive more protections and considerations than enemy
65
66

Id. at 1.
Id.
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combatants.67 Thus, doctors and medical professionals must act
with intentions to assist these patients, rather than ignoring or
intentionally wanting to cause their immediate suffering, even if
they ultimately act in the detainee’s best interests overall.
According to these international conventions, doctors must care for
their patients as ‘physicians first,’ rather than as a soldier or other
role that may place the patient second to other considerations.68
Lastly, though these proposed policies require notice requirements,
arguably these abuses are jus cogens – crimes against humanity –
and the offending individuals should know that medical
professionals do not provide their services to support torture and
abuse. Thus, withdrawing from providing these medical services
do not necessarily require notice that is generally required by other
medical duties.
In addition to the war conventions, special protections are
guaranteed in the physician-patient relationship, such as
confidentiality and continuity.
In these circumstances, the
physician can approach the physician-patient relationship in two
ways. First, the doctor can consider that a physician-patient
relationship does not exist because the doctor does not intend to
treat the detainee, and the doctor has this intent from the
beginning. She must act in a way that would not lead a detainee to
perceive that he is the doctor’s patient. Further, such as the doctors
in Libya did, the doctors may remove themselves from the prison
hospital, so that they would not be present to even receive the
patients. Second, if the doctor decides that a physician-patient
relationship does exist between the detainee and doctor, the doctor
may decide that refusing to treat is the best course of treatment
that the patient should receive. In addition, the doctor may have
other issues, such as patient consent, which is raised in Section 5.3.
Patient confidentiality would also be implicated in these
circumstances. However, the doctor can keep the patient’s identity
confidential, especially in regards to military reporting
requirements, or, more likely, consider that revealing this
information is not a breach of confidentiality because it is used for
the protection of other persons from a known risk and because the
See supra Section 2.1.
See Annas, supra note 31 (citing the ’physician first‘ mantra, but
concluding that “’physician first’ guidance is only half the story;” though “[b]asic
human-rights violations, including torture, inhumane treatment, and
experimentation without consent, can never be justified”).
67
68
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information is revealed internally to determine a future course of
action or treatment. These additional duties are very important
and should be considered in how the medical professionals follow
the proposed requirements of this policy, though medical
professionals will have to balance these duties with the overall best
interests of the patient.
4. LEGAL EVALUATION
Providing care can be considered as violating torture laws and
policies because when doctors help keep detainees well enough to
participate in abusive interrogations and torture, they are aiding in
the cycle of torture. These doctors can be seen as participants in
torture, either as complicit to torture or implicated as participants
in a conspiracy, much like criminal conspiracy. On the other hand,
although refusing to provide care is ethically justified and
providing care is illegal, refusing to provide care can also violate
some current torture statutes, international laws, and policies.
Because detainees are required to receive adequate medical care,
one could find that doctors refusing to provide care are in violation
of these statues. To correct this possibility, I propose clear
exceptions, along with certain requirements to these policies in
Section 5.
4.1.

Violations of Torture Statutes and Criminal Laws

Complicity to torture is a violation included in many torture
law policies. Article 4 of Convention Against Torture (CAT)
requires countries to establish crimes for torture, including
complicity to torture.69
Currently, the United States has
established the Torture Victims Protection Act, which established
“an unambiguous and modern basis for a cause of action” for
torture violations.70 Article 3 of UN Resolution 37 also expressly
prohibits medical professionals’ participation and complicity in
69
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc CAT/C/28/Add.5, art. 4, entered into force
Feb. 9, 2000. See also Weissbrodt & Heilman, supra note 22, at 353 n.51.
70 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102–256, H.R. 2092, 106 Stat.
73 (1992).
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torture.71
It states, “It is . . . an offence under applicable
international instruments, for health personnel, particularly
physicians, to engage, actively or passively, in acts which
constitute participation in, complicity in, incitement to or attempts
to commit torture.”72 Thus, if medical professionals do continue to
treat patients as a part of a cycle of torture, they could be held
liable for directly violating these statutes.
Under the U.S. Model Penal Code (MPC) definitions of
conspiracy and complicity, an individual is held criminally liable
for crimes that a group of which she is a member commits. These
crimes require only belonging to extend this liability.73 With the
MPC, the law assumes that even if an individual is not directly
participating in the crime, they are nonetheless liable because of
their membership and knowledge of what the group plans to
commit, finding them implicitly involved.74 As discussed infra in
Section 5.3., rather than helping to prevent abuse, medical
professionals’ presence during interrogations actually enables
improper interrogation tactics.75 Criminal Conspiracy, § 5.03 of the
MPC, states “[a] person is guilty of conspiracy with another person
or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of . . . facilitating
its commission [s]he . . . agrees to aid such other person or persons
in the . . . commission of such crime.”76 For complicity, § 2.06 states
“a person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of
an offense if . . . with the purpose of . . . facilitating the commission
of the offense, [s]he . . . aids . . . such other person in planning or
committing it.”77 Because torture is without argument a crime,
doctors and other medical professionals could be considered
complicit or co-conspirators to torture in circumstances where
medical professionals are aware of abuse and continue to treat the
detainees who they know will ultimately endure further torture.
The element of ‘with the purpose’ will most likely relieve most
medical professionals from liability because they will not likely
have the “conscious object to engage in [torture] or to cause such a
71 Principles of Medical Ethics, G.A. Res. 37/194, 111th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/Res/37/194 (Dec. 18, 1982).
72 Id.
73 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.06, 5.03.
74 Id. (lacking a requirement for actually committing the alleged crime).
75 Infra notes 82–84.
76 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03.
77 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06.
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result.”78
Doctors in extreme examples of purposefully
participating in torture through providing treatment or
information to make interrogations more efficient will likely be
liable under complicity and conspiracy. This analysis will rely on
the true intentions of the medical professionals involved and how
much they intended to aid the offending individuals. However, it
is worth noting that, even in these extreme situations where
doctors actively assisted interrogators in Guantanamo, no cases
have ever held a doctor complicit to torture or as a co-conspirator
to torture.
4.2.

Distinguishing Between the Gray Areas

Having physicians in the interrogation room and directly
participating in torture by providing medical information is strictly
prohibited because the physician carrying out those roles clearly
violates medical ethics and abuses their role as a medical
professional. These black and white scenarios, as discussed above
and as seen in Libya, also exist when providing care to detainees
clearly becomes a part of a cycle of torture. On the other side of the
spectrum, other circumstances exist where physicians are simply
treating detainees for general health care concerns, such as for
diabetic shock, and are clearly justified, and required, to treat these
patients. However, with much of the legal framework that exists,
gray areas occur in the hard cases, but this existence does not
foreclose on creating policy for clear situations where refusing to
provide care is clearly ethical and legal. Physicians would still
have to treat wounds from interrogations upon the first instance
when they do not know if the wounds resulted from a cycle of
repeated improper interrogation or torture. Upon this first
instance, physicians would have to give notice and report such
instances, then, if the medical professionals receive the same or
similar injuries from the same or different patient, they will have to
make a medical determination to refuse care.

78
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (stating the definition of “act[ing]
purposely”).
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5. PROPOSAL FOR POLICY
Laws and policies should protect medical professionals who
refuse to provide care to detainees when they determine that the
detainees will only endure further abuse if treated. Policies
protecting this decision should also be created to ensure
safeguards are in place to reduce the risk of abuse. Comprehensive
policy should include reporting and notification requirements to
best protect the patients, doctors, and offending individuals from
the risks of abandoning care without the chance to first correct the
abusive behavior. Again, refusing to provide care to detainees will
remain an exception to torture policies, not the rule.
5.1.

Providing Exceptions Based on Reasonable Medical
Judgment

The policy proposition is to create an exception to the
requirement of providing adequate medical care for detainees.
This exception would allow a physician or medical professional to
refuse to provide adequate medical care when they know or
reasonably believes that a detainee or a group of detainees is being
subjected to repeated abuses in interrogation or torture. The
physician or medical professional must reasonably know that
providing care will lead the detainee to endure continued pain and
suffering that results from these abuses. Before the exception can
be invoked, the physician must first know or believe that abuses in
interrogation or torture occurred and must provide notice, if
possible and safe to do so, to the offending individual(s),
government(s), or organization(s) that if the abusive behavior do
not cease, the physicians or medical professionals will withdraw
from providing care. The medical professional must also report
the perceived abuse to their medical and military supervisors, if
possible and if safe to do so. This report must include important
and relevant facts about the detainees, injuries, and other
circumstances so that the supervisors are able to assess and
provide feedback regarding the refusal of care. Approval from the
supervisors is not required.
The standard of ‘knowledge’ is actual knowledge or reasonably
should have known given the experience of the physician.
Ignorance is, thus, not an excuse. The physicians working in Libya
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made the determination of torture because the wounds on the
detainees obviously resulted from beatings and other abuse.79
Again, this policy aims at holding liable those physicians who fail
to take the proper action, or refused to act, in circumstances of
clear torture or abuse. These policy changes are not meant to
interfere with the medical autonomy of a physician who must
decide, based on their reasonable assessment of a certain
circumstance, whether a detainee is a victim of repeated torture or
not.
Currently, New York and Massachusetts have state bills
pending before their legislatures that address medical
professionals facing circumstances of abuse in interrogations.80
Massachusetts House Bill 2017/Senate Bill 101181 in the 188th
Legislature would establish professional sanctions for medical
professionals participating in torture and abusive interrogations.
The bills also include reporting requirements and protections for
medical professionals that “refuse to participate in prohibited acts
or who investigate them.”82 The New York bill provides similar
‘bright line’ provisions to protect health care professionals actively
refusing to participate in the abuses.83 The proponents of these
bills find that additional legislation is “vitally important” because
it provides state professional sanctions on professional behavior
that “violates professional standards;” improves and protects the
medical profession’s reputation, domestically and internationally;
and promotes human rights.84 The Massachusetts bill expressly
Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, supra note 32.
MA and NY Legislation to Sanction Health Professionals Who Torture,
PHYSICIANS
FOR
HUM.
RTS.,
available
at
http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/issues/torture/us-torture/ma-and-nyanti-torture-legislation.html (last visited on Dec. 17, 2013).
81
S.
1011,
188th
Leg.
(Mass.
2013),
available
at
https://malegislature.gov/Bills/BillHtml/126793?generalCourtId=11.
These
bills have received support from Physicians for Human Rights, Massachusetts
Medical Society, and Massachusetts Campaign Against Torture. The similar bill
in New York received endorsements from the New York State Nurses
Association, “15 leaders in the medical and health fields – including two Nobel
Prize winners, former President George H.W. Bush’s White House physician, and
New York-based medical school deans and hospital CEOs,” and others. Press
Release, Top Medical Professionals Support NYS Anti-Torture Bill, Nation’s First (May
25, 2010), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/comm/Health/20100526/.
82
MA and NY Legislation to Sanction Health Professionals Who Torture, supra
note 80.
83 Id.
84 Id.
79
80
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prohibits a health care professional from “engag[ing], directly or
indirectly, in the torture or abusive treatment of a prisoner” and
includes the explicit prohibition of “examining, evaluating, or
treating a prisoner to certify whether torture or abusive treatment
can begin or be resumed.”85 These bills serve as good examples for
the exceptions that should be made into domestic and international
policies.
5.2.

Reporting and Notification Requirements

When doctors and medical professionals first make the
determination that they have received a patient that is being
subjected to abusive interrogations or torture, the doctors should
continue to treat the detainee. After this initial determination, the
doctors and medical professionals must take steps to notify the
offending individuals of their concerns by stating that the medical
staff will refuse to provide care if such behavior continues. This
notice should only be made when providing notice does not risk
the safety of the medical professionals.
Reporting requirements refer to the supervising body of
medical and/or military professionals to which the doctors and
medical professionals are assigned. Physicians and nurses should
engage these two lines of control when possible. The supervising
medical professionals can assist in making a professional
determination of whether the doctors should withdraw from
providing care and can serve as a unbiased supporting body that is
both patient- and doctor- focused, rather than, for example, serving
as a soldier first. The medical community, much like the legal
profession, is a self-regulating profession.86 Thus, providing notice
to another medical professional will assure extra protection against
internal discipline and may also provide a ‘safer’ supervising body
for reporting because it is comprised of peers. The doctors and
physicians should also report to military supervisors that may
have more influence and/or control over the offending body. This
reporting also provides protections to the doctors by putting the
military supervisors on notice of how the medical professionals
S. 1011, supra note 81, §§ 1D(b), 1D(b)(iii).
See
Our
Mission,
AM.
MED.
ASS’N,
http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-mission.page? (last visited Dec. 18, 2013)
(detailing guiding principles to improve and monitor the medical profession).
85
86
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will handle this particular situation in case the military needs to
make strategic decisions based on the refusal of treatment or based
on the notification that torture is occurring.
Though reporting requires putting supervisors on notice,
reporting does not interfere with medical autonomy. Medical
professionals can benefit from their supervisors’ input, but are not
required to follow their proposals if the medics on the ground
reasonably determine that refusing treatment is the best course of
action.
Similar to how the Army Field Manual provides
requirements for reporting to the commander,87 physicians should
follow similar lines of reporting within the military and with the
equivalent superior in the medical field. The EU Guidelines
Towards Third Countries on Torture also encourages establishing
“effective domestic procedures for responding to and investigating
complaints and reports of torture.”88 States should also ensure
they currently operate functional venues for receiving and
addressing reports of torture that military and medical
professionals can access.
Providing notice is equally important to internal reporting
because notification could potentially change the offending
individuals’ or organizations’ behavior without having to
withdraw care. The ultimate goal of refusing to treat detainees
subjected to torture and abuse is to have this behavior to end, so if
this behavior can change through the ‘threat’ of withdrawing from
providing care to detainees, without having to do so, that is a
major success. In Libya, Doctors Without Borders indeed tried this
tactic by providing notice to the organizations that tortured the
detainees, but they continued to receive patients exhibiting the
same or similar injuries.89 Only after giving this notice did the
doctors refuse to treat.90 Though the doctors were not successful in
this example, it is a prime example that notification can and should
be executed before withdrawing treatment. Together, notice and
reporting provide two venues to alternatively stop abusive
interrogations and torture without refusing to provide care for
patients that need immediate assistance.

ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 6, at 5–14.
GUIDELINES TO EU POLICY TOWARDS THIRD COUNTRIES
note 11, at 7.
89 Press Release, Doctors Without Borders, supra note 32.
90 Id.
87
88
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Counter Arguments and Concerns

Risks to the medical profession, outside of ethics, are also
present and generally raised in opposition to restricting the
medical profession in a time of war. Some argue that the presence
of medical professionals in interrogations will limit what military
and other actors do in these interrogations. However, The
Constitution Project’s Report on Guantanamo reports that that the
presence of medical professionals provided an implicit
authorization to the interrogators behaviors.91 These individuals
would think, ’If it gets too bad, the doctors will stop it‘ while the
doctors did not have any authorization and were not empowered
to make such interventions.92 As former military medic and
psychiatrist, Dr. Robert Jay Lifton, explained, “[A medical
professional’s presence] can confer an aura of legitimacy and can
even create an illusion of therapy and healing” when that
environment did not exist.93 Thus, this logic not only proved to be
false, but it actually worked counter to its desired result. By
providing policies that give medical professionals the
authorization to refuse to provide care in certain circumstances, the
doctors and medical professionals can better protect patients as
well as provide better support and guidance for the military to
comply with interrogation procedures.
Another risk that comes into play with physicians and nurses
refusing to provide care is the damage to trust of the medical
profession. However, this risk to trust must also be understood
against its alternative action, which is treating patients to make
them healthy enough to endure repeated aggressive interrogations
and/or torture. This risk of perceived compliance to torture also
comes with risks to the medical community that is addressed
within the community, including recent conferences.94 This
THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 18, at 30–31.
Sharrock, supra note 14 (providing a story from a Guantanamo medic,
Andrew Duffy, that quoted him as saying, “If a medic was around, there was a
sense of some control . . . . The guards probably thought, ‘If I really cross the line,
this guy would stop me.’”).
93
Robert J. Lifton, Doctors and Torture, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 415 (2004),
available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp048065.
94 See, e.g., The Constitution Project & Global Lawyers and Physicians, PostConference Summary: Medical Care and Medical Ethics at Guantánamo, Washington,
D.C. (Dec. 2, 2013) (discussing bioethical issues raised in Guantanamo, such as
“impact of health professionals’ involvement in interrogations on detainees’ trust
91
92
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perceived participation in improper interrogations also places the
offending country in weak position to regulate the international
community and other individual countries that also involve the
medical community in such behavior.95 It “damage[s] the moral
standing of [these] doctors,” including American doctors.96 Dr.
Steven Miles states that after the Bush Administration, the United
States is “now in an extremely poor position to protest abuse in
other countries.”97 He also warns, “It will silence us as a medical
community.”98 This distrust and ‘silencing’ is analogous to the
distrust that the U.S. death penalty created for European doctors.99
To protect the status of medical professionals that chose to
participate in the international medical community and the
public’s trust in its doctors, these provisions that will allow and
empower doctors to refuse to provide care to detainees should be
developed.
Most doctors and medical professionals would not argue that
refusing to treat detainees subjected to repeat torture is unethical,
much like most of the medical community do not refute that
psychiatrists cannot ethically find a patient competent for
execution. Dr. Chiara Lepora, M.D, the current program manager
for Doctors Without Borders, and former Bioethics Fellow at the
National Institutes for Health (NIH), and Dr. Joseph Millum, Ph.D
and staff scientist in the Clinical Center Department of Bioethics
and Fogarty International Center at the NIH, argue that, though
treating detainees may constitute complicity in torture, this
in military physicians”).
95
See Sharrock, supra note 14 (reporting bioethicist Dr. Steven Miles’s
concerns).
96 Id. (referring to comments made by AMA critics who believe even putting
new standards in place will not correct the damage that this past behavior has
caused).
97 Id. Though this statement was made before the 2014 Senate report on the
CIA’s detention and interrogation program, one would assume this sentiment also
applies to the Obama Administration. 2014 SENATE CIA REPORT, supra note 16.
98 Id.
99
See John Gunn et al., Comments to Forum on Psychiatrists and the Death
Penalty: Some Ethical Dilemmas, 11 CURRENT OPINION IN PSYCHIATRY 3 (1998),
available
at
http://www.wpanet.org/uploads/Publications/WPA_Books/Additional_Public
ations/WPA_Forums_on_Current_Opinion/psychiatrists-death-penalty.pdf (“In
[light of the U.S. constitution,] it is difficult for European people, who have (with
the notable exception of some countries of the old USSR) effectively given up the
death penalty, to understand why a civilised nation indulges in the ritualised
cold-blooded killing of individuals . . . .”).
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determination does not constitute an absolute prohibition.100
Rather, Lepora and Millum state that doctors must consider
multiple factors before refusing to treat, and can still be justified in
treating, even when it amounts to complicity to torture (if then
minimized).101 These factors include:
First, doctors should assess the consequences of the
different options open to them, including not only
consequences for themselves and for the patient, but also
the possible wider social effects, such as encouraging or
discouraging policies that permit torture. Second, doctors
should attempt to discern and follow the requests of the
patient regarding his or her care. Finally, doctors should
weigh the degree to which the act would be complicit in
torture.102
Though Lepora and Millum raise factors that should be
included in the physician’s initial determination that she has a
duty to the detainee not to treat him, Lepora and Millum focus
largely on consequences of the actions of refusing to treat. The
medical professional involved should consider the consequences of
not treating, but these consequences should remain patientfocused, as is the doctor’s duty, and only to the extent that the
consequences trigger the medical professional’s duty to refuse to
treat. By focusing on duties, the doctor is more likely to act in
consideration of their intentions and can focus on the more
immediate pattern of abuse, rather than hypothesizing about an
unreliable, ‘ultimate’ consequence for the patient and other social
considerations. Lepora and Millum also consider if the offending
individuals (i.e. the torturers) want that the detainee receives
treatment. The offending individuals’ desire to have the detainee
treated is only relevant when it indicates whether torture will
occur again. If a doctor finds that the interrogator’s expression of
concern regarding treatment is not indicative of whether they will
torture a detainee, then the doctor should not consider it. Though
this argument is overall consequentialist rather than intention and
100
Lepora & Millum, supra note 2, at 38 (“[S]ometimes the right thing for a
doctor to do, overall, is to be complicit in torture.”).
101 Id. at 39.
102 Id.
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duty focused, this argument includes consideration for patient’s
wishes and advocates for receiving informed consent. To the
extent possible, a patient’s desire to receive treatment, even if they
may be subjected to further torture, may factor into a medical
professional’s determination of overall harm suffered by the
patient. This consideration of the patient’s wishes in the face of
repeated torture must reach standards of informed consent to
receive care, i.e. not from duress and from a full understanding of
the future pain and suffering, and be a part of a reasonable medical
decision.
Another counterargument is that policies permitting the refusal
of providing treatment are subject to abuse because, though the
medical profession is self-regulating, the community has not
disciplined doctors who participate in improper interrogations or
torture. One news report stated that “even as the nation debates
disbarment for the Bush administration lawyers who green-lighted
torture, the medical profession has dealt reluctantly, if at all, with
its own involvement.”103 This lack of discipline is especially found
when government officials or state policy provides for such tactics.
Retired Army General Dr. Stephen N. Xenakis, M.D., who is
described as a “rare outspoken critic among military doctors,”
stated, “’The indifference [of the medical community] is
shocking.’”104 Most doctors and medical professionals treat based
on codes and can only reach those who are subject to these codes.
Providing policies, much like those proposed in New York and
Massachusetts, that require internal reporting to other medical
professionals and the use of professional medical judgment can
empower doctors to use their discretion based on what they
observe, rather than military protocol. The internal reporting can
also strengthen how strictly doctors are held responsible for these
actions. Reporting requirements also assist with limiting abuses
because it involves supervising medical professionals at an earlier
point in the decision to treat, or not treat, than policy currently
requires. Because of this early intervention, reports regarding the
reasonableness of the reporting physician are taken, which can be
used for assessing whether discipline is required. For example, if a
supervising physician expresses serious concern about the
reporting physician’s assessment of the situation in the field, then

103
104

Sharrock, supra note 14.
Id.
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the disciplinary committee knows that the reporting physician was
put on notice that her medical judgment was not reasonable,
supporting disciplinary action. Again, these situations are for
those clearly in violation of medical and moral ethics where even a
physician looking at a cold report could make a decision one way,
rather than the close cases that depend more on the facts of the
case. However, concerns of abuse do not rise out of these ‘gray’
cases, but rather out of cases that clearly require the refusal of
treatment. In addition, clearer and more pragmatic definitions of
what is permissible may empower disciplinary board and assist
courts in taking more action because abuses are more identifiable.
6. CONCLUSION
Doctors and medical professionals are legally and ethically
required to refuse care in certain circumstances when treating
subjects of interrogations. At a certain point, doctors and medical
professionals obey the Hippocratic Oath by refusing to provide
medical care to those subjected to repeated improper
interrogations and torture. These professionals must use their
reasonable judgment based on their medical training and
knowledge of the immediate situation to reach a determination
that providing care will only make the injured individual a victim
to further, ongoing torture. Along with this judgment, medical
professionals must properly report such abuses, and adequately
notify the offending individuals or organizations that they will
have to refuse further care if the abusive interrogations do not end.
The international community and individual States, including
the United States, must provide adequate policies and practices to
allow medical professionals to make this judgment. These policies
and laws include providing protection from legal and professional
consequences under torture statutes and other law. In these
circumstances, ‘do no harm’ is not requiring ‘do nothing’ but
rather empowers doctors to refuse to participate in torture and
work towards its end through putting the international community
on notice.
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